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A B S T R A C T
Missing or incomplete data on actors’ positions can cause
significant problems in political analysis. Research on
missing values suggests the use of multiple imputation
methods rather than case deletion, but few studies have yet
considered the non-ignorable problem – positions that are
hidden for strategic purposes. We examine this problem and
discuss the advantages and drawbacks of (i) multiple impu-
tation as implemented in AMELIA; (ii) a computationally
easy but, in the context of spatial modelling, straightforward
measure of indifference and (iii) a conditional averaging
algorithm, LDM, which seeks to reasonably fix actors’ posi-
tions in the policy space pre- and post-imputation. The
analysis suggests that actors biased by the status quo strate-
gically hide their more supportive positions. Although none
of the existing methods – which produce quite different
results – is perfectly suited for imputing hidden positions,
LDM has the highest hit rate for the conjectured more
supportive position.
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Missing positions: An ignorable problem in political
analysis?
Missing or incomplete data on actors’ bargaining or policy positions can cause
significant problems in political analysis. Although empirical political studies
can hardly avoid missing positions – whether they gather this information
from documents or from expert or mass surveys – we have little knowledge
about how to cope with this missing value problem. This deficit is surprising
because our theories and tools of analysis are not designed for disregarding
missing positions. Ignoring this problem risks biasing our findings: explo-
rative analyses of the policy and bargaining space may fail to identify cleav-
ages and dimensions, decision-making analyses risk making false predictions,
and – as de Gaulle’s politics of the empty chair nicely exemplifies – the dis-
regard of a country’s vital interest expressed in a missing position could
mislead our historical insight into a nation’s power and sovereignty.
In our research, missing information on actors’ positions could have these
negative implications and affect our understanding of the deliberative process
of constitution-building in the European Union (EU). Despite these negative
effects, political scientists rarely discuss concepts dealing with missing data.
In a broader examination of survey studies, King et al. (2001) found that, in
94% of the articles published between 1993 and 1997 in APSR, AJPS and BJPS,
political scientists used listwise deletion of missing data, reducing their
sample on the average by one-third. In this article, we want to draw atten-
tion to the more specific problem of missing positions and reveal how critical
the decision either to delete or to impute missing positions is.
Outside of political science, generations of statisticians have developed
unbiased, model-specific solutions designed to eliminate the loss of existing
information. Under specific assumptions about the missing data-generating
process, modern statistics go far beyond the conventional methods of missing
value imputation, such as listwise deletion, pairwise deletion or mean impu-
tation. Alternatives are based on maximum likelihood or multiple imputation
using Bayesian statistics (Allison, 2002; Graham and Schafer, 2002). At the
same time, the measuring of positions is becoming an increasingly common
practice in political science (Laver and Hunt, 1992; Poole and Rosenthal, 1997;
Budge et al., 2001; Laver, 2001). Scholars use actors’ positions to make infer-
ences about the nature and dimensionality of policy and bargaining spaces
as well as to test prominent theories of political decision-making (Laver and
Shepsle, 1994; Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman, 1994; König and Pöter, 2001;
and Thomson and Stokman, 2006). Deleting dimensions or excluding actors
because of missing values might significantly bias their analyses and findings.
In the following, we compare different methods for imputing missing
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values within actors’ positions. Our missing value problem concerns item
non-response (estimators for positions on a few issues that are missing),
which is generally solved by imputation. However, although research on
missing values emphasizes the superiority of multiple imputation methods
against case deletion, few studies have taken the problem of non-ignorable
missing values into account – positions that are hidden for strategic
purposes.1 We attempt to consider this problem and discuss the advantages
and drawbacks of (i) multiple imputation as implemented in AMELIA (King
et al., 2001); (ii) a computationally easy but, in the context of spatial model-
ling, straightforward measure of indifference; and (iii) a conditional averag-
ing algorithm, which might help scholars to reasonably fix the actors’
positions in the policy space.
Criteria and goals of missing value imputation of
positions
In any empirical analysis, we will not find all information stored in docu-
ments nor will interviewees answer all questions. In political science, one
reason for non-documented information or refusal is that actors do not want
to uncover their positions, which can be defined as actors’ bargaining or ideal
points (Bueno de Mesquita, 2004). For this reason, opinion polls and experts
are often used to estimate the positions of the key political decision-makers.
Apart from the problem of receiving reliable opinion estimators and finding
expertise, some of the interviewees may still fail to answer a question on a
particular topic. As a result, the data may contain various codes indicating
the lack of an actor’s position: ‘don’t know’, ‘refuse’, ‘unintelligible’. Once the
study has been completed, all of these various answers have the same effect:
they generate missing values on the positions of actors.
The question of whether missingness creates serious problems for politi-
cal analysis easily prompts the answer ‘yes, it does’. Most political science
research and theories assume ‘completeness’, i.e. in terms of covering the
whole policy and bargaining space or information, including the knowledge
about all actors’ positions. To impute missing values in a straightforward
manner raises, however, methodological problems and analytical challenges.
Note that we do not intend to recover, restore or predict missing values. The
imputation of missing values is a means of achieving the overall goal of social
research, namely ‘to make valid and efficient inferences about a population
of interest – not to estimate or predict, or recover missing observations nor
to obtain the same results that we would have seen with complete data’
(Graham and Schafer, 2002: 149). Our central goal is to impute missing values
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in a way that minimizes distortions and bias of the respective analysis’s infer-
ential parameters (e.g. equilibria, coefficients).
In general, political scientists have a finite data set that consists of a repre-
sentative sample of the population it was drawn from. These data usually
contain a number of variables V = {v1 . . . vn}, and we seek to detect system-
atic and causal relationships between these variables (Bankhöfer, 1999). A
necessary condition for generality, however, in making statistical inference
above the finite number of outcomes is that the data set is representative of
the population of outcomes. Compared with data used for statistics, data on
actors’ positions complicate the situation, although the goal of political
analysis remains the same: most often the models are strategic and interactive,
and the processes are dynamic.
Our DOSEI (Domestic Structures and European Integration) study
attempts to collect information on the positions of the actors involved in the
process of EU constitution-building. Knowing the actors’ utility functions,
their action sets and the structure of the political game, we might be able to
make outcome predictions by solving the game for its equilibria. Thus, if we
do not capture all relevant actors and their positions, the utilities and action
sets should at least mirror the political game as played between the popu-
lation of actors. Hence, in the event of missing positions, the goal is to keep
the parameter estimates and the solutions to the game (e.g. core, yolk, finite
set) undistorted as compared with the game played in the population of actors
(or as compared with the population of games). But the best means of achiev-
ing this goal depends on the types of missing value in our DOSEI data set.
Types of missing value: Missingness
In current research on missing values, ‘missingness’ is regarded as a proba-
bilistic phenomenon (Rubin, 1976). For any rectangular data set having the
form: actors n times issues m, we can define variables that account for what
is missing (Rnm = 0) and for what is observed (Rnm = 1). R describes a statisti-
cal distribution of missingness, even if we do not find a specific distribution.
Because missingness may be related to the data, we can classify R according
to the nature of that relationship between observed data and missing values
(Graham and Schafer, 2002: 151). According to Rubin (1976), the main
assumptions in the treatment of missing values are whether these values are
missing completely at random, missing at random, or non-ignorable.
Political science studies mostly assume values to be missing completely at
random (MCAR), which means that the probability for Ryn = 0 is independent
from both the values on Y and the values on X (King et al., 2001).2 Consider a
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situation in which the positions on X (X1 . . . Xk) are known for each actor, but
the positions on Y (Y1 . . . Yk) are partly missing. MCAR is only given when
the probability for missing values on Y depends neither on the other values of
Y nor on the values of X (and, by independence, not on the values of other
actors). In the very few political situations in which the missing values are
completely at random, ‘the set of individuals can be regarded as a simple
random subsample from the original set of observations’ (Allison, 2002: 3).
Only if values are completely at random could one run the analysis on the set
with complete information without having to worry about biased results.
Most of the MCAR critics claim that listwise deletion is highly problem-
atic owing to the exclusion of cases (issues) with missing positions. The strong
assumption holds only when the cases with complete information represent
a random subsample within the original sample (Little and Rubin, 1987). King
et al. (2001) find that ‘the point estimate in the average political science article
is about one standard error further away from the truth because of listwise
deletion’ (King et al., 2001: 52). The main virtue of listwise deletion is its
simplicity, but, in our case, it would be likely to lead to false results. Since
the deletion of a decisive issue or actor may create serious problems, it is
preferable to draw on the weaker missing at random (MAR) assumption and
to impute the missing values in Y using its systematic relation to X.
MAR assumes that the probability of missing data on a specific policy
issue is independent of the positions of this issue once the effects of the
remaining variables in the data set are taken into account. This means that
the probability that Ryn = 0 may depend on X but not on Y. Although the
deletion of cases is justifiable only under MCAR, the MAR assumption allows
a researcher to use information about the relationship of Y to the other vari-
ables X in order to impute missing values. This relationship can be:
• the multivariate distribution of the variables,
• the distribution of the missing values across variables,
• the covariance and correlation between the variables,
• and, for data on positions, we can add the positional configuration
(preference profiles) of the actors.
A whole battery of solutions exists for using the information from the other
variables. Either multiple imputation (MI)3 or Maximum Likelihood (ML)
imputations are recommended for linear analytical models (Allison, 2002;
Graham and Schafer, 2002). ML has rarely been used in political science
research because it is based on the principle of choosing ‘as estimates those
values that, if true, would maximize the probability of observing what in fact
has been observed’ (Allison, 2002: 13), given a specific model.
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The third and possibly most realistic assumption is that non-ignorable
missing data exist if the probability of missing values on a certain issue is
dependent on the positions of this issue (MNAR). MNAR means that the
probability that Y is missing depends on Y – an actor does not mention her
position owing to other actors’ positions. Here, some residual dependence
between missingness and Y remains after accounting for X (Graham and
Schafer, 2002: 151). MNAR requires a researcher to consider this selection bias
explicitly within the analytical framework (Heckman, 1976; Winship and
Mare, 1992; Agarwal, 2001). Dealing with data on actors’ positions and strate-
gies, we still might be suspicious about whether or not the data fulfil the MAR
assumption or whether they suffer from non-ignorable missingness. We inter-
viewed many experts from within and outside government, but some missing
values still exist in the DOSEI data. To deal with this missing value problem,
we will present the pros and cons of three prominent methods of imputation
and then analyse these missing values in more detail.
Methods to impute missing positions
As for most political science research, deleting cases is no solution for our (and
others’) missing value problem. But how can we deal with missing positions?
A more general recommendation would be to replace them either with another
value or with the means (conditional or unconditional) of the other actors’
positions. We believe that these solutions are also problematic because they
dramatically reduce the variance of the variables with missing data by using
the same value for all cases with missing data (Graham and Schafer, 2002: 160).
Moreover, it is inappropriate to use mean imputation with variables measured
at the nominal or ordinal level. They seriously distort inferences (tests and
confidence intervals) by creating bias and overstating precision; thus, such
imputations cannot be generally recommended (Little, 1992: 1231).
Sophisticated solutions to the missing value problem drawing on the
MAR assumption usually argue that there is always uncertainty in missing
data imputation, and by imputing only one value this uncertainty is arti-
ficially reduced to zero. As a result of eliminating the uncertainty from the
model, the standard errors of the estimated coefficients are biased towards
zero, making it easier to find significant relationships in the data. Next to ML
estimation of missing values, multiple imputation is another way to address
the uncertainty issue directly. It should be noted that, although the multiple
imputation procedure assumes that the data are jointly multivariate normal,
this assumption is very robust to departures from normality. Another advan-
tage of this method is that the number of data sets imputed is relatively low:
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‘the relative efficiency of estimators with m as low as 5 or 10 is nearly the
same as with m = , unless missingness is exceptionally high’ (King et al.,
2001: 56). Certain requirements must be met for MI to have these desirable
properties: the data must be missing at random, the model used to generate
the imputed values must be correct, and the model used for the analysis must
match the model used in the imputation (Rubin, 1976, 1987).
In general there are three facets of information in the data that can be
utilized to reasonably impute the missing values in this context by consider-
ing (i) the entire data set (distribution, covariance etc. across cases and vari-
ables); (ii) the information in the single variables (issues); (iii) the information
on the cases (actors). We will present three different methods for missing
value imputation, each with a different focus on the observed data, and
evaluate their usefulness within our context.
AMELIA
AMELIA offers a modified version of the expected maximization (EM) algo-
rithm for multiple imputation (for details, see King et al., 2001). Multiple
random imputation of missing values specifies the multivariate distribution
of the variables in the data based on the existing data (see Rubin, 1987). The
means and covariance are used to predict the regression coefficients (in the
case of a linear regression model) for each of the variables. Using these regres-
sion coefficients, the missing values are imputed and the multivariate pos-
terior distribution is specified. These steps are repeated until convergence is
reached. The researcher can choose the number of complete data sets to be
generated. All complete data sets are then combined according to Rubin’s rule
(1976) to calculate the statistical model of interest (see Allison, 2002: 29ff.; King
et al., 2001).4
Compared with ML imputation, multiple imputation is ‘probably less
sensitive to the choice of the model because the model is only used to impute
the missing data not to estimate the other parameters’ (Allison, 2002: 32), but
it nonetheless hinges on assumptions that might be critical for data applied
to decision-making theories:
• all variables have normal distributions (although AMELIA appears to be
fairly robust to deviations from normality; King et al., 2001),
• each variable can be represented as a linear function of all the other vari-
ables, together with a normal, homoscedastic error term (Allison, 2002).
Regarding non-ignorable missingness, AMELIA does not cover the likelihood
function between the observed and the missing values on Y. Moreover, the
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assumption of mutual linear representation between all variables is problem-
atic if we consider different types of actor (such as domestic versus EU level)
and different underlying policy dimensions. Although AMELIA offers solu-
tions for the missing value problem in a straightforward and statistically
precise mode of imputation, the problem of strategic hiding of positions
remains and has to be addressed in the analytical model.
Indifference
As described by Hinich and Munger (1997), an efficient model of missing
value imputation does not necessarily have to mirror the exact positional
configuration of the complete political game. Instead it is sufficient that the
imputed values for the actors do not distort the key solution concepts. This
may imply that the reason for the missing position is the indifference of the
specific actor with regard to the issue at stake. In other words, the solution
concept of choice could be determined without knowing the exact position
of every actor, but the analytical model requires that all actors have to be
included. Indifference means that ‘indifferent actors take a position such that
the decision outcome agreed on by the other actors is allowed to pass; in other
words, they interfere as little as possible’ (Thomson and Stokman, 2006: 20).
The underlying behavioural assumption is that ‘actors who have no interest
in a particular issue want to ensure that the outcomes of the discussions
between the actors who do have an interest are reflected in the decision
outcomes’ (p. 20). Using indifferences for imputation also requires awareness
of the underlying analytical model. For spatial models that will be applied to
the DOSEI data, it might be reasonable to impute the middle (indifference)
position between the status quo (or reference point) and the draft constitution.
As far as possible win sets to the status quo are concerned, this imputation
method ensures that no possible solution between the analytical fix points is
diminished or reduced.
Although indifference is straightforward for spatial analysis, its draw-
backs are obvious:
• the model hinges upon the assumption that missing positions are due to
the actors’ indifference between two analytically derived points in the
policy space,
• in order to make use of this idea in the most efficient way, it should be
implemented on a model-specific basis. This can pose challenges to cross-
model comparison.
In the light of a non-ignorable missing value problem, indifference is possibly
European Union Politics 6(3)2 7 6
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problematic because hiding positions suggests a more extreme position. It is
therefore questionable that indifference is the primary explanation for miss-
ingness in the DOSEI data if the MNAR assumption is met.
Likelihood to deviate from the mean (LDM)
Another approach to evaluating the goodness of an imputation model applied
to a positional data set compares the actors’ configuration in an n-dimensional
policy space in the data set before and after imputation. Assuming that each
variable on positions is of equal weight, we try to minimize the following
equation:
(1)
where E is the mean Euclidian distance between actor i and actor j across m
variables k before (t–1) and after the imputation (t):
, where j i. (2)
Trying to solve the minimization problem, we are left with a system of equa-
tions for which no unique solution exists. Assuming completeness and the
equal weight of all issues, we first need to order the issues in accordance with
an underlying policy dimension, such as more vs. less integration, left vs.
right (Zimmer et al., 2005). Ordinal data are then transformed on a pseudo-
metric scale via marginal normalization5 and standardized on an interval {0;1}
with  = .5. One obvious solution to equation (1) would be to use the mean
position an actor holds across all issues referring to the same underlying
policy dimension. Owing to the marginal normalization applied to the data
before, this corresponds to the ML estimator for the joint cumulative proba-
bility function of actor i and variable x. However, because we are using
pseudo-metric data only, there may be no equivalent to the mean on the
underlying ordinal scale. Therefore we take the value of the underlying
ordinal scale that is most likely (in terms of cumulative probability under the
p.d.f). To fit the imputation model with the configuration of the completed
data set, we repeat the whole process (using the completed data set) until
convergence.6
This algorithm may be best understood as a combination of conditional
averaging across the single cases (Graham and Schafer, 2002: 157f.) and a case-
wise ML estimation. It suffers from two major drawbacks:
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• the assumption that all issues are of equal importance for the underly-
ing policy dimension, and
• the ordering of all issues in accordance with an underlying policy dimen-
sion.
The LDM concept might partially solve a censoring problem in the DOSEI
study. Based on the knowledge about the actors’ general stance towards the
underlying policy dimension, LDM imputes a reasonable value for the sensi-
tive issues that one cannot observe. In contrast to AMELIA, it does not require
mutual linear relationships between the variables and is not distorted by the
different functional roles that actors may perform in the decision-making
process. If we want to dismiss the rigorous assumption that all issues are of
equal weight, we could combine LDM with a latent trait model found in Item
Response Theory (Congdon, 2001: 223 ff.).
Missingness in data on positions: DOSEI data
What kind of information did we gather for measuring positions in the DOSEI
study? If missing values occur, which assumptions (MCAR, MAR, MNAR)
can we make about the (missing) data-generating process, and which method
can we use to impute missing positions? To answer these questions, we turn
our attention to the research design and sampling techniques, which are
related to the missing value problem. In the DOSEI study, we use data
gathered by the following instruments:
• text/content analysis (inter alia, Laver and Budge, 1992; Klingemann et
al., 1994; Budge et al., 2001; Gabel and Hix, 2002; Laver et al., 2003;
Pennings et al., 2004),
• expert interviews (inter alia, Castles and Mair, 1984; Laver and Hunt, 1992;
Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman, 1994; Huber and Inglehart, 1995; Ray,
1997; Thomson and Stokman, 2006), where sampling often depends on
how much leeway the researcher is willing to grant the expert,
• survey data using opinion polls (inter alia, Gerber, 1996; König and Hug,
2000),
• statistical analyses of roll-call votes (e.g. Poole and Rosenthal, 1997; Cox
and Poole, 2001; Mattila and Lane, 2001; Mattila, 2004), and
• delegates and parliamentary amendments (Tsebelis and Money, 1995).
Although the number of missing positions may vary across the data
gathered by these instruments, they share one common problem: a conscious
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and subjective choice of actors and/or policy issues by either the researcher,
the public or an expert remains vulnerable to selection bias. The limited avail-
ability of information on the positions brings about a risk of non-ignorable
missing values. Our strategy of interviewing more than one expert per
country is one reason for the small percentage of missing values observed in
the aggregated DOSEI data set. We asked the experts to indicate only the posi-
tions of actors deviating from the national position (NP), which allows us to
replace non-indicated values for domestic actors with the respective NP. The
rectangular data set contains 136 actors with 65 questions on the relevant
issues, and thus 8840 cells, of which 389 are not filled. From these 389 cells
with no position, 252 could be filled with the NP indicated by the experts.
However, 137 (or roughly 1.6%) of the data entries still remain as missing
values. As Table 1 shows, their distribution varies – with very few exceptions
– at the level of entire countries but not at the level of actors.
Explaining the occurrence of missing positions
According to social psychologists (Tourangeau et al., 2000; Tourangeau and
Smith, 1996), an interviewee has to (1) understand the question, (2) recall the
relevant information, (3) map this information onto the possible answers, and
(4) be willing to edit the correct answer. In terms of missing positions, whereas
the first three steps correspond to an interviewee’s lack of competence, the
fourth step concerns unwillingness or inability to reveal the correct answer.
We therefore propose to check the appropriate assumption on the probabil-
ity of missing positions in Y in the DOSEI data set by distinguishing between
two reasons for missing values:
(a) the expert did not know the position of actor i on issue Y for any reason
other than (b) (lack of competence),
König, Finke and Daimer Ignoring the Non-ignorables? 2 7 9
Table 1 Missing policy positions in the DOSEI data set (total N = 8840)
AP observed AP missing
N % N %
NP observed 8451 95.6 252 2.85
NP missing 8 0.09 129 1.46
Note: 27 official national positions [NP] (member states, Commission, EP)
+ 109 domestic actors’ positions [AP] = 136 actors  65 issues = 8840 cases.
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(b) either the expert hid extreme positions on sensitive issues or the actor
was able to disguise the position for strategic purposes.
In the event of the first situation, we are close to fulfilling the MCAR or at
least the MAR assumption because the limited knowledge of our experts on
Y may reveal some covariance structure with X. However, if the second situ-
ation is true, we can rely only on MAR or we may even have to deal with
MNAR. In this case, it is plausible to suppose that an actor strategically hides
her position on Y because of the positions held by other actors on Y, so that
the probability of R = 0 depends on the values of Y. Whether we should
assume MNAR to be more appropriate for defining how the missing values
on Y might look is, however, an ‘extremely difficult task’ to solve (Allison,
2002: 71). But, if actors hide positions for strategic purposes, the question
arises of how this aspect of the missing data-generating process should be
considered in our analysis – even if the percentage of missing values is
comparatively small.
A reasonable starting point for thinking about the occurrence of missing
positions might be to ask under what conditions it is advantageous for an
actor to hide her national position on a specific issue. In our study, we can
assume that all countries must agree on the constitutional text, which might
imply a bargaining advantage for actors biased towards the status quo. They
can expect to gain concessions, whereas actors more supportive of policy
change have to make offers in order to find agreement for changing the status
quo. In these circumstances, if an actor is located close to or at the status quo
of an issue, it does not make sense for her to hide her position. This actor will
gain concessions only when the other actors share a more supportive position
and know about her status quo bias. Hiding a status quo position accordingly
risks only that the other actors might wrongly believe that she is in favour of
the more supportive position. Similarly, if this actor shared the views of the
other actors, why should she risk that they might possibly draw another
(wrong) conclusion and change the outcome towards a more extreme
position? There seems to remain only one condition under which an actor
will reasonably hide her position, namely when the other actors need to be
led to believe that she has a status quo bias on the draft text and are thus
willing to offer her concessions, when she in fact has a more supportive
position on the specific issue. Only in this case must this actor fear gaining
fewer concessions and therefore have an incentive to conceal her position.
This suggests a selection bias of missing values for status quo located actors
far away from other actors’ (supportive) positions.
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Examining missing positions with selection bias
The usual suggestion for linear modelling is to include a possible selection
bias from the underlying structure in the analytical model (e.g. Heckman,
Tobit; see Winship and Mare, 1992). One way to uncover the underlying struc-
ture of missingness is to estimate a probit regression on whether or not a case
had any missing values, followed by a Poisson regression on the number of
missing values encountered. Furthermore, one can separate both effects by
estimating a Heckman full ML selection model, which includes three types
of variables for our analysis:
(1) An actor’s mean distance to the status quo (MESQ) as a proxy for her
status quo bias, and an actor’s mean distance to the mean of other
national positions (MENP) as a proxy for the distance to the bargaining
outcome at the EU level. A large distance to NP and a small distance to
SQ would confirm our expectation that actors with strategic views on
constitution-building explain the occurrence of missing positions.
(2) Variables on the actors’ position in relation to the domestic political
debate: a measure for heterogeneity operationalized as an actor’s mean
distance to the other actors in her country (AVDIST), an actor’s distance
to the national position (DISTNP), an actor’s average greatest distance to
other actors of the same country (DISTMAX), and the average percent-
age of issues where at least one domestic actor’s position is identical to
the status quo (PERSQ). These variables refer to the domestic situation
and indicate whether the relative location of an actor, with respect to her
preference of the status quo, her distance from other domestic actors, the
national position and the opposite actors, explains the missing positions.
(3) Finally, we add the number of interviewees per actor found in a country
as a technical control variable (NUMINT).
We adjust all variables for effects resulting from different scales.
Using the DOSEI data set we first estimate a probit regression on a
dummy variable indicating whether or not we encountered at least one
missing value for a particular case. According to Table 2, MESQ and MENP
reveal large and significant effects on the likelihood of encountering any
missing values: the larger the distance to the approximate bargaining outcome
(estimated as the mean of all national positions) and the smaller the distance
to the status quo, the more likely it is we will encounter at least one missing
position. We also find that this likelihood increases with the contestation of
the national position (NP) within a country (DISTNP).
Next we estimate a Poisson regression on the number of missing values
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2Table 2 Probit model, Poisson regression and Heckman Selection Model on missing policy on the occurrence and number of missing
policy positions
Probit Poisson Heckman
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
N = 136 N = 136 (uncens. obs. = 34)
Distance to NP (DISTNP) 3.29** –1.09 6.89*** –2.35 7.24*** –1.15
Maximum distance to other domestic actor (DISTMAX) 0.33 –1.23 –3.99*** –0.91 –7.55*** –1.42
Average distance to other domestic actor (AVDIST) 3.38 –3.70 –2.18* –1.31 –16.21*** –4.48
Number of interviewees (NUMINT) 0.13 –0.21 –0.34** –0.15 –0.31 –0.25
Percentage of issues with IP = SQ (PERSQ) –0.86 –1.94 11.39** –2.85 –6.62*** –1.63
Mean distance to the SQ (MESQ) –2.11*** –0.67 –2.46*** –0.44
Mean distance to mean of all NPs (MENP) 2.37** –1.36 8.04*** –2.47
Constant 0.22 –2.06 19.89*** –3.99 10.61*** –1.04
Selection stage (cens. obs. = 102)
Mean distance to the SQ (MESQ) –0.93*** –0.27
Mean distance to mean of all NPs (MENP) 3.86*** –0.95
Constant –1.60** –0.80
athrho –1.45 –0.65
lnsigma 0.53*** –0.21
rho –0.89 –0.13
sigma 1.70 –0.35
lambda –1.52 –0.50
LR test of independence of equations (rho = 0): Prob > chi2 = .001
Wald/Chi/LR test: Prob > chi2 = .000 .000 .000
Pseudo-R2 .692 .315
*significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level.
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encountered. This analysis confirms the effects as already revealed by the
probit regression plus additional effects with respect to the domestic constel-
lation of positions: the larger the mean distance of an actor to the other
domestic actors (AVDIST) and the larger the average largest distance to any
other domestic actor (DISTMAX), the fewer missing values we can expect.
The results confirm our expectation and reveal that two different effects are
responsible for missing values: the first is the strategic hiding of positions
where these actors have a status quo bias and are far from the other actors’
mean position. This effect appears to be especially related to the positions
held at the EU level. The second effect concerns the prominence of a position
and thus the ease of identification by the interviewee.
In order to separate the effects on the likelihood and the number of
missing positions, we finally run a full ML Heckman model. The two vari-
ables related to the policy space are included in the selection stage and we
insert the other variables into the second stage. The coefficients reveal the
same algebraic sign as in the Poisson regression, but the coefficients are
slightly larger. The percentage of issues where at least one of the actors (in
the same country) has a position identical to the status quo has a negative
impact on the number of missing values. One possible reason for this relation-
ship is that it is easier to identify positions during the national debate if one
of the relevant actors is on the status quo. The value for rho (= .89) indicates
the expected selection bias between these two effects on this level of data
aggregation, although we cannot completely avoid correlation in the residu-
als of both steps.7
The empirical analyses show that the different actors’ locations in the
policy space determine the likelihood of encountering any missing values in
the first place. Actors strategically hide their position when they can expect
to receive more concessions. The number of missing positions is additionally
explained by the ease of identification or the prominence of an actor’s position
compared with that of other domestic actors. This suggests that the remain-
ing missing values in the DOSEI data set are MAR, if not MNAR. But how
do the three methods cope with this problem? Do they vary in their imputa-
tion results and, if so, to what extent do they provide us with a plausible
imputation?
Variance and goodness of imputation
To answer these questions we first assess whether and to what extent the
different modes impute different values, focusing on the differences between
AMELIA, LDM and indifference. Table 3 displays the number of positions
imputed differently and the average difference on a pseudo-metric scale by
König, Finke and Daimer Ignoring the Non-ignorables? 2 8 3
02_konig et al_054833 (jk-t)  13/7/05  2:14 pm  Page 283
each combination of the three methods. As the underlying ordinal scale of
the 65 issues has 2.8 real values on average, it is remarkable that AMELIA
imputes 114 and 103, respectively, of the 129 missing values differently from
the imputations suggested by indifference and LDM. LDM and indifference,
by contrast, produce only 68 different values.
The three imputation methods produce quite different solutions and it
remains difficult to find an absolute criterion for the goodness of the impu-
tations in a methodologically rigorous manner. We propose to rely on our
theoretical and empirical analyses of the underlying mechanism suggesting
that actors biased towards the status quo and far from other actors may have
an increased motivation strategically to conceal their more supportive posi-
tions. Thus, when we presume that the expected outcome may be approxi-
mated by the mean position of all actors, we are able to distinguish the
interval between status quo and expected outcome (status quo interval) from
the interval between expected outcome and draft proposal (draft interval) in
order to identify a more supportive hidden position.
For these conditions, Table 4 lists a ‘hit rate’ of imputed values (IV), where
IV > expected outcome. Compared with indifference, which systematically
imputes more values in the status quo interval (because the expected outcome
is closer to the draft than to the status quo), AMELIA imputes slightly more
positions in the draft interval. Finally, LDM reveals the highest ‘hit rate’ of
a more supportive position on the draft. The reason is that, across all
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Table 3 Variance in imputation: Number of differently imputed values and average
difference on pseudo-metric scale
LDM AMELIA Indifference
LDM 0 103 68
Amelia 93.6% 0 114
Indifference 42.3% 96.1% 0
Note: N = 129. 
Table 4 Hit rate (|Imputed Value – Draft| < |Expected Outcome – Draft|)
Scale LDM AMELIA Indifference
Ordinal scale 82.7% 64.6% 35.4%
Pseudo-metric scale 78.0% 59.1% 55.9%
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dimensions, even the actors relatively biased towards the status quo are still
close to the draft position, which frequently lies in the ‘draft interval’. Using
an ordinal scale, LDM imputes about 74% of all cases of the draft position.
Conclusion
Missing or incomplete data on actors’ positions can cause significant problems
in political analysis. Although this problem has rarely received attention in
political science research, the growing number of political analyses increases
the relevance of the data problem of missing policy positions. Political
analysis uses actors’ positions as the basic variable for the study of political
phenomena, and theories and tools of analysis are not designed to ignore
missing values. In our view, when we use data such as the DOSEI data on
constitution-building for explorative, comparative and theory-testing
purposes, ‘application-specific approaches’ are often ‘worth the trouble’ in
handling missing values (King et al., 2001: 58). In our view, the problem of
non-ignorable missing positions (MNAR) is non-ignorable.
In political science and our research on constitution-building, we can
hardly assume non-strategic behaviour, but the imputation for MNAR
requires a model-specific solution. If the model is linear, Heckman and Tobit
are possible solutions to this problem. But, if the model is not linear, no
standard tool is available, although the advances in Item Response Theory
suggest promising concepts (Winship and Mare, 1992; Congdon, 2001: 233 ff.).
Instead of using stronger assumptions, such as MCAR and MAR, we propose
examining the likelihood of the strategic concealment of sensitive positions
in the data set, even though we encounter a very small percentage of missing
positions in the DOSEI data.
Our findings suggest that we can neither use MCAR and delete the few
cases with missing positions, nor completely reject MNAR. Missing positions
occur when actors biased towards the status quo seem to have extreme posi-
tions vis-à-vis the other actors at the EU level, and the number of missing
positions is explained by the identification problem of the interviewee.
Although none of the existing methods for imputing missing values is
perfectly suited to MNAR, LDM seems to come close to resolving our missing
value problem in the DOSEI data. Compared with the prominent AMELIA
tool, LDM considers the relative positions of the individual actor. Indifference
is based on an opposite theoretical assumption about the underlying mech-
anisms leading to missing values.
Our empirical evaluation also shows that the three concepts produce
quite different results. In other words, researchers should carefully consider
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which method of imputation they wish to apply for imputing positions. Even
with a comparatively low percentage of missing positions, the method of
imputation can lead to significantly different findings because the resulting
imputed values may vary greatly. We recommend (a) checking carefully the
underlying causes of missingness and examining whether MCAR, MAR or
MNAR may hold; (b) considering whether political analysis needs a complete
data set by taking into account the theoretical insights on the policy space;
(c) deciding which concept of missing value imputation solves the missing
value problem best; (d) bearing in mind the missing value problem when
interpreting the findings of the policy analysis.
Notes
The authors are grateful for helpful comments by Simon Hug and financial
support of DOSEI by the European Commission under grant No. HPSE-CT-
2002–00117.
1 The literature dealing with non-ignorable missing values generally recom-
mends using selection models (e.g. Heckman, 1985; Winship and Mare, 1992)
and pattern mixture models (Little, 1993). Most of it deals, however, with unit
non-response in either longitudinal studies (e.g. Molenbergh et al., 1998;
Glynn et al., 1986) or bias introduced by selection on Y (Hug, 2003).
2 If we separate our complete data Ycom into a set containing missing values
(Ymis) and a set with non-missing values (Yobs), missing completely at
random means that P(R|Ycom) = P(R), and missing at random occurs when
P(R|Ycom) = P(R|Yobs).
3 In particular, MICE (Multivariate Imputation by Chained Equations) for R is
another freely available and useful MI package (http://web.inter.nl.net/
users/S.van.Buuren/mi/html/mice.htm). For an overview of other,
primarily commercial, programs for MI see Allison (2002: 34).
4 The algorithms leading to convergence can be divided into data-augmenta-
tion algorithms – especially IP (Imputation-Posterior) algorithms – and EM
algorithms. Whereas IP takes random draws from the entire posterior in order
to calculate the subsequent regression coefficients, the EM uses the determin-
istic means of the posterior. Data augmentation is slightly more accurate in
theoretical terms, but it is computationally much more involved and suffers
from convergence problems. AMELIA uses EMis (Expected Maximization
sampling importance/resampling) as a default algorithm. This algorithm as
employed by King et al. (2001) steps back in estimation uncertainty by
sampling from the asymptotic approximation of the entire posterior and
controlling for what the authors call the ‘importance ratio’ – the ratio of the
actual posterior to the asymptotic approximation. EMis seeks to combine
computational efficiency and accuracy. AMELIA, including documentation,
can be downloaded from URL: http://G.King.harvard.edu/.
5 Marginal normalization divides the space under the standard normal
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distribution into k equal parts in accordance with the relative frequency of
each class k (for details, see Hartung, 2004). It is equivalent to a probit link
function in Item Response Theory (e.g. Johnson and Albert, 2001).
6 If we wished to keep the parameters of the p.f. stable, we could use the pos-
terior p.d.f.s. In this case the algorithm would be close to EM, but based on
a different model.
7 We repeated the same analyses using the raw data. The algebraic signs of the
coefficients remained the same, but the pseudo-R decreased significantly. In
addition, it was impossible to separate the effects in a Heckman selection
model (rho = 1). We conclude that this difference is due to a higher percent-
age of missingness at random.
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